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John F. Scarpa Chair Lecture
LAW AND WHO WE ARE BECOMING
PATRICK McKINLEY BRENNAN*

E

NGLISH usage requires that the letter "c" in the word Catholic be
capitalized inasmuch as it is part of the title John F. Scarpa Chair in
Catholic Legal Studies. This is lovely, except that the required capitalization obscures whether the word is being used in its big "C" or its small "c"
sense. Might the difference matter? It is no secret that with a small "c" the
word means "universal," whereas capital "C" Catholic concerns the universal church founded by Jesus Christ upon St. Peter and remaining today in
full communion with the Bishop of Rome. That Church refers to itself as
Catholic because of its self-understanding that it is sent by Christ to the
entire world.1 The Catholic Church brings Christ's gifts to all who will receive them; and those gifts include, though they also exceed, revealing to
man who he already is.
But though the capitalization required by the title veils whether the
"c" would otherwise be lower or upper case, there can be very little
doubt-can there?-about what John Scarpa and Dean Sargent had in
mind when they were masterminding this Chair, and I wish to say, in all
candor, that I respect this, indeed I would not be here today were it otherwise. The Catholic Church as part of its universal mission has much to
contribute to all people's aspirations to ordered living, to treatment consistent with their dignity as creatures made in God's image and likeness, to
the free expansion of their potential; and it has been my concern in teaching and writing to bring Catholic questions and learning to bear on what
we aspire to in the name of the law.
Before saying more about that, I wish to say a word of thanks to those
present who have made it possible for me to be here at Villanova, especially John Scarpa, Father Dobbin, Dean Sargent and all you faculty members who worked so effectively to recruit not me-for me, the decision was
easy-but my wife Jaime, a Sonoran desert flower from birth. What made
the decision easy for me was the passion for the Catholic intellectual tradition that extraordinary teachers early awakened in me and have sustained
over more than a quarter century. First there was Brother R. Columban
F.S.C., the Christian Brother who in 1978 introduced young Patrick to the
* John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies and Professor of Law,
Villanova University School of Law. B.A., 1988, Yale College; M.A., 1989,
University of Toronto; J.D., 1993, Boalt Hall, University of California, Berkeley.
Inaugural Lecture, John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies, Villanova
University School of Law, November 12, 2004.
1. See CATECHISMUS CATHOLICAE EccLEsIAE Sec. 831 (1997).
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thought of John Henry Newman. Now ninety years old, Brother
Columban shows no sign of declaring my ignorance invincible. Next came
Louis Dupr6, who taught a college sophomore to value the thought of
Father Bernard Lonergan S.J. So successful was Dupr6, he effected a Jesuitical turn in my intellectual development that is rued even now by my wry
Dominican friend and teacher Father Richard Schenk, who is here with us
today. Lonergan's debt to Newman paved the way for me to embrace
Lonergan's retrieval and development of the mind of Aquinas, and Dupr6
showed me how in Lonergan's, as in all authentically Catholic thought,
nature must not be separated from grace. After college and then two
years of graduate work in medieval philosophy, a special grace brought
ProfessorJack Coons and me together in Boalt Hall, where Jack eventually
managed-I didn't make it easy-to teach me that we must believe that all
of us equally can be good persons, however "hasty and awkward" Holmes
(about whom, more later) might find us and our negative externalities. As
no one else, Jack Coons discerns the mighty consequences for law and
society of a belief that we already stand to one another as equals who are
better than the homogenization that goes forward in the name of equalizing outcomes or opportunities. I thank Jack for it all, including his presence here today. (Who besides Jack Coons could survive having to
educate two generations of Brennans?) After law school came a clerkship
with Judge John Noonan, a chance to learn up close how a Catholic jurist
works methodically to apply and develop rules in order to serve persons he
knows to be created in God's image and likeness, the method inspired for
Noonan by none other than Cardinal Newman. Finally, three other legal
minds, especially Joseph Vining, John Witte and Thomas Kohler, have inspired me by the example of their work and fortified me through their
friendship. The shortcomings in my work cannot be traced to a shortage
of great teachers and scholars in my life.
I recall the first time I saw the advertisement for the John F. Scarpa
Chair in Catholic Legal Studies-the admiration I felt for what Villanova
was undertaking with John Scarpa's help, even the anticipatory envy of the
person who would enjoy this estimable opportunity. Given my abiding
concern to study the Catholic tradition-while drawing on the contributions of Protestant and non-Christian scholars-in order to identify and
meet questions of law and politics of moment to us all, where better to
work than in a passionate Augustinian community, an inclusive Catholic
law school? Imagine then, if you will, the shock of surprise when, quite
out of nowhere, my phone rang in Arizona and it was Dean Sargent calling
to interest me in the Scarpa Chair, and then again when he called back to
ask me to accept the Chair. I could not have dreamt up a better help to
my work.
And there is work to be done, for the Catholic tradition, notwithstanding rumors to the contrary, is on the move. While Catholics believe
that revelation ended with the death of the last apostle, they simultanehttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss2/2
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ously insist that "insight grows into what has been handed down." 2 Evolution happens whether we like it or not; insight occurs, and tradition and
doctrine develop (rather than petrify or regress), only when minds care
enough to work out the direction and the transitions. It is Catholic doctrine that some of what happens in human history depends on the success
of humans' probing, among other sources, the deposit of faith in hope of
developing sound doctrine to live by in a changing world. A question on
which Catholic doctrine has developed, with significance for how we view
law and civil society and their role in history, concerns the relationship
among grace, nature and capital "C" Catholicity. I shall postpone these
questions of a theology of grace to the end, not because they are an unimportant afterthought, but exactly because they control the meaning of
what comes before. First, I think, we must do what we can to get to know
the persons-the human subjects-these doctrines concern, which brings
me to my topic of who we are becoming.
The inauguration of this Chair in Catholic Legal Studies seems to offer an invitation, which I shall like to accept, to say something about a
whole approach to law. What I have to say today is an encapsulation of
some aspects of an overall project, which I am working out in many parts,
that attempts to re-conceive (what we think of as) the rule of law along lines
3
suggested by the foundational insights of Father Bernard Lonergan.
Lonergan searched many subjects, but he barely touched law. The foundational insights he proffered, though, are full of legal promise; indeed, I
deny that any generation can live-at least, not lawfully-without them.
Though Lonergan is a helpful guide, we can live without him; what I mean
by our needing his insights, if we are to live lawfully, will become clear as I
proceed. To convey something of my overall project without compromising the party at Dundale Mansion, I must leave a lot out, even some fundamentals. We shall need examples, though, for the dialectic that ensures
that the jurisprudence and law it invites are fit not for a Platonic heaven or
a Panglossian utopia, but for this world that we inhabit and create. It is
here that we fail or succeed in making ourselves into persons who are not
merely technically competent (effective bureaucrats or clever lawyers), but
responsible actors, indeed good lovers of one another in all our living.
Unlike in Plato's heaven, where the good abides fully wrought, in us, "the
good is something under construction."4 In aid of this construction, I pro2. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, CONSTITUTIO DOGMATICA DE DIVINA REVELATIONE (DEI VERBUM), par. 8 ("[C]rescit enim tam rerum quam verborum
traditorum perceptio.").
3. See, e.g., Patrick McKinley Brennan, Meaning'sEdge, Love's Priority,101 MICH.
L. REv 2060 (2003) [hereinafter Brennan, Meaning's Edge] (reviewingJAMES BOYD
WHITE, THE EDGE OF MEANING); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Realizing the Rule of Law
in the Human Subject, 43 B.C. L. REv 227 (2002) [hereinafter Brennan, Realizing the
Rule of Law]. Forthcoming is a book tentatively titled LAWFUL SUBJECTS: INSIDE THE
RULE OF LAW.

4. Flannery O'Connor, A Memoir of Mary Ann, in FLANNERY O'CONNOR: COLLECTED WoRKS 830 (Sally Fitzgerald ed., 1988).
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pose a rule of law inspired by (what I call) a jurisprudenceof intelligent subjec-

tivity, a jurisprudence that focuses on how we human subjects become
lawful through the dynamic operations of our human intelligence. When
law looks "largely irrelevant to the self,"5 as it can hardly help but do when
our starting points are rules and regulations rather than ourselves in our
potential for intelligence in action, law's desuetude and disregard, and
our own declension and decay, await little or no further explanation.
When, in approaching norms with which to bind individuals and create
community, we instead focus on "the inner experience of the subject who6
is involved in the event of discovering, accepting, and observing the law,"
we are on the way to becoming good-or at least better-persons, even
lawyers. Hence my title, Law and Who We Are Becoming.
I.

GETTING TO THE SUBJECT

A.

Knowing Ourselves

Some sixteen centuries ago, Saint Augustine of Hippo turned inward
to know both God and the creature wrought in His image and likeness.
More than a millennium later, Descartes deployed his "cogito" rather to
distance the human subject from the divine order Augustine had
fathomed with his "proto-cogito."7 Kierkegaard in due course offered a corrective, but on the heels of it came Freud, who, suffice it to say, has been
around long enough for us to kill and then resurrect him multiple times.
This game has not yet seen its final season, and meanwhile we have grown
more afraid to know ourselves. "'Know thyself,' we hear suggested to us
for our own good. We hardly know ourselves,"8 observes Joseph Vining.
Which is a problem for law, because, as Vining also observes, "[t]he questhe law 'is' is not so very different from the question what we
tion what
'are'." 9 This is because-I shall argue-norms capable of binding human
subjects at the level of intelligence are the product of the individual
human subject's, and the community's collective, obedience to (what I
0
shall call) inner law)
KEvIN M. CROT=I, LAw's INTERIOR 90 (2001).
LADIsLAs ORsy, THEOLOGY AND CANON LAw 154 (1992).
7. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 132 (Harvard

5.
6.

Univ. Press Reprint ed., 2002) (1989).
8. JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWrON'S SLEEP 344 (1995).
9. Id. at 128 (emphasis added).
10. "Inner law" is my expression, but the phenomenology of human knowing
worked out in this Part, though it quotes them sparingly, is drawn from the writLONERGAN,

INSIGHT: A

INSIGHT]; more

compendi-

ings of Bernard Lonergan. The primary text is BERNARDJ.F.
STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

(1958) [hereinafter

ous is Bernard Lonergan, CognitionalStructure, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD
LONERGAN 205 (Frederick E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran eds., Univ. of Toronto

Press 1988) (1967). My understanding and presentation of Lonergan's thought
owe much more than I can trace to the secondary literature I have studied over
nearly twenty years.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss2/2
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Rather than all at once, I shall come at inner law, and how it is already
at work in us, in stages. The first point to observe is simply that whatever
you are doing, whatever activity you are engaging in-whether it be dining, dancing, reading or even law-you bring to bear certain assumptions
about how it is you know what it is you do know, or would like to know.
These operative assumptions control, explicitly or implicitly, how you go
about acquiring and sharing knowledge. Assuming (as I shall here) that
we are not in the grip of a thoroughgoing determinism, the key to increasing success is to take conscious possession of the tools of your knowing. If
neither knowing nor not-knowing is inevitable, then knowing how to know
should be of some help.
Lest, on the basis of this call for knowing how we know, you conclude
that I have embarked on a frolic and detour, consider that in medieval
argument, angels who lacked bodies were believed to do what knowing
they did through mighty powers of intellectual intuition. A footnote in
the history of philosophy would add that Descartes's model of human
knowing sounds rather more angelic than human. 1 But the footnote
would not end there, because many, perhaps most notably the Scottish
school of "Moral Sense," to which not only Charles Reid but also the more
famous (or infamous?) Thomas Jefferson subscribed, have taught that
what knowing we all do with respect to morals occurs thanks to a special
faculty for intuition, a kind of occult sixth-sense. There are libraries
packed with views on how we know what it is that we know. The pertinent
point in this is that these epistemologies do-and should-have social conse-

quences.12 James Madison knew as much when he made Federalist FiftyOne an occasion to observe that we must rely on human rather than angelic means. 13 If we are to succeed at this, we need to know how we
human subjects function. If, for instance, you suppose you know thanks to
God's whispering in your ear, you'll want to turn down the music and
unstop your ears, so as not to make the Almighty raise His voice. If morals
were known by intuition, ears and dialogue and dialectic would have no
place in moral knowledge's entrance, nor would there exist the possibility
of (fraternal) correction. Prescinding from the matters of grace reserved
to the end, the only alternative to law that is grounded in a correct grasp
of human intelligence is law that is beneath our intelligence. But taking a
stand on intelligence requires getting to know who we really are. The barbarian, as John Courtney Murray observed, can wear a Brooks Brothers
suit;1 4 he can hold aJ.D., be admitted to the Order of the Coif, pursue a
stunningly successful career in the highest places in the land, and never
have heard of Delphi.
11. See DAVID
27 (1987).

TRAcY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY:

HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION,

HOPE

12. On the current, pervasive mismatch between law and its avowed presup-

positions, see STEVEN SMITH, LAw's QUANDARY (2004).
13. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
14. See.JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 12 (1960).
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The second point to observe is that if you come to know anything at
all, this is because you are curious. If you utterly lacked a spirit of inquiry,
you would know nothing. Please note: I do not say that you would experience nothing. While you are alive, you cannot avoid experience; but experiencing is not knowing. I strike my foot against a stone and it hurts; it's
another thing to know what is happening. I look at the newspaper in
search of palindromes; to know the words' and sentences' meanings is to
do something else. Knowledge follows experience only if one is curious
(and creative) enough to make it happen. Witness the true story of an
American wending his way through the British Museum. Reaching the
Rosetta Stone, he reached right over the railing (this was back when they
still had a railing that you could reach right over), touched the scarred old
slab, and lamented: "It doesn't feel meaningful." Whereupon an old
Briton was heard to mumble: "The poor American's got this old thing
confused with the Blarney Stone." 15 The American experienced the stone
but he missed knowing its meaning; he touched and gawked, and this
mere experiencing was as close to knowing as he got. He needed first to
be genuinely, not just idly, curious.
The third point to note, then, is that we are not curious in a vacuum.
What we question, we first experienced. By "experience" I mean the sensory
flow, constant while I am awake, of my sensing as well as my imagining,
feeling and remembering. Whether I like it or not, through my
neurophysiological structures I am steadily experiencing sights, sounds,
smells, memories and so forth. The contents of the sensory flow are for
me givens-"data" in the root sense of that word. Letting my curiosity
operate, I am attentive to the data of experience.
Fourth, even this attentive experiencing is not knowing. If attending
to the data of my experiencing made me a knower, there would be no
point to questioning them. But I do question them, and to my questioning there is a point. When I ask, "What is it? What does it mean?," the
question is heuristic; it undertakes to discover something in the givens.
Merely gawking at or touching the Rosetta Stone, I'm not going to know
anything, let alone its meaning. Once I question what I experienced, I'm
on the way to knowing something.
Fifth, the next stage on the way to knowing something is answeringthe
"What is it? What does it mean?" question. The answer is not yet knowledge. The answer is an interpretation of the data; it is, in other words, a
proposal of what intelligibility may lie latent in the data. Before people
rediscovered the meaning of hieroglyphs, thanks to the Rosetta Stone,
many interpretations were tried and rejected. Not just any interpretation
will do, but often it takes time to hit upon the right one. We need to be
intelligent about our experience; we need to be creative, insightful in our
interpreting. The genius should have a better time of it than the dullard.
15. See Brennan, Meaning's Edge, supra note 3, at 2060.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss2/2
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In any event, our interpretations-these potential intelligibilities-are
ideas in need of verification.
So, sixth, we question our interpretations to determine whether they
are correct. Questioning our experience led to a bright idea, the interpretation; now we ask whether our bright idea is a true idea. We ask, "Is it so?
Is this in fact what hieroglyphs mean?" The answer to this question is not
another bright (or dim) idea. The answer is a judgment, the human subject's determination that the evidence is sufficient to support his interpretation, his proposal of what intelligibility was latent in the data. The
judgment is nothing other than his personal commitment to the sufficiency of
the evidence to support his judgment. But if the judgment is properly
taken, this is because the subject has, with respect to the experience in
question, satisfied the desire to know. The claim here is not that in reaching a
judgment you become possessed of 'justified belief' or an "opinion"-as
though that's the best we humans can do. No, the claim is that when you
judge that the evidence is sufficient to support your prospective judgment
(your interpretation), you become a knower.
Of course, if there remain nagging questions about the sufficiency of
the evidence, you cannot reach knowledge; likewise, if bias prevents you
from letting all relevant questions occur, you cannot reach knowledge of
the thing. In either situation, the best you can do is to judge consistent
with what evidence you have, and this might be to say that you do not
know or that "x" is "probably" so. You can alwaysjudge; even if you do not
understand the data, even if your interpretation fails, you can say that you
do not understand, and that is itself a judgment.' 6 You can always constrict the field of prospective judgment to what you do know. However,
when you can and do make the personal commitment that there are no
further relevant questions, that the evidence supports your understanding
(interpretation), then you can reach (what Lonergan refers to as) a "limited absolute." 7 By satisfying the desire to know, we become knowers. But
if we fail to question our experience, or omit to question our interpretations of it, or 'judge" without regard to the inner law that is the desire to
know, our lawlessness has confusion and ignorance as its consequence. Of
this, the poor man stymied by the Rosetta Stone is Exhibit A. Daily life
and world history teem with less benign examples.
What I have been suggesting is how knowing is not some simple, unitary act, but is instead the compound of structured acts of experiencing,
understanding and then judging according to the standard set by the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know. This perhaps innocuous-seeming thesis-that knowing is not looking, but instead involves a
series of irreducibly different acts governed by inner law-conditions all
that will follow here. Inasmuch as knowing requires the success of several
16.

See JOSEPH FLANAGAN,

GAN'S PHILOSOPHY

QUEST FOR SELF-KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY IN LONER-

125 (1997).

17. See id. at 136-37.
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different kinds of acts, those who would say what the law is and give it
effect must become skilled at those several acts. If the jurists in the Brooks
Brothers suits are operating at the level of human intelligence in their
practice of law, they will be attentive experiencers, intelligentinterpreters of
experience and reasonablejudges of the sufficiency of the evidence for
their interpretations. Merely rolling the eyes of the mind would be easier,
if only it were possible; what is called for is the cultivation of the personal
characteristics that allow for making the personal commitment that respects inner law.
If you are not already disposed, thanks to earlier introspection and
reflection, to grant my claim about knowing's being a compound of structured and related operations, nothing I can say here will change your
mind. But the idea is, as they say, on the table; and it won't go away. If
you feel a kind of skepticism welling up within, permit me, before proceeding, to put a question to you. Are you a knower? My question, you
will notice, does not ask whether you know some thing. The question concerns not what but whether you know. Are you a knower? You might not
be, in which case you will have nothing to say, because you will not have
understood, among other things, nly question. But, if you answer "yes" or
"no," "maybe" or "maybe not," you are a knower. Why? Because you could
not answer if you had not first known. Not only that. The fact of your
response is itself evidence that you know through the pattern of acts I have
described. Why? Because in the process of responding to my question, at
the very least in hearing the sounds of my speaking, you will have experienced; through questioning that experience and trying to understand my
meaning, you will have reached an interpretation of the meaning of those
sounds leaving my mouth and reaching your ears; and, questioning that
interpretation and concluding whether the evidence was sufficient to support it, you will have judged.
B.

Knowing and Realizing Value

So far I have considered inner law as it governs knowing what is. We
are not just knowers, however; we are also doers. And our doing is not
necessarily undirected, or directed only to the extent of our knowledge of
what exists. No, the desire to know extends itself beyond knowledge of
what is, to knowledge of what can be. We can know what is valuable, what is
worth our doing. And we know what is worth doing in basically the same
way as we know what is. Knowing occurs in the judgment that, as to the
matter in question, satisfies the pure question. 'Judgments of value differ
in content but not in structure from judgments of fact."18 Judgments of
value do differ from judgments of fact inasmuch as our feelings can help
us apprehend the valuable, but our feelings are not themselves judgments
(of value); and until we judge, we do not know. Judgments of value go
beyond what is, to what it would be truly good or better to bring into
18.

BERNARD LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss2/2
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being. Deciding to act to instantiate the good, the valuable, is to be
responsible.I9

Our culture of ethical non-cognitivism freights inquiry into how we
know the good or valuable with a burden that is impossible to meet from a
podium. David Hume's echo can deafen us to the emergence of the
ought that is part of who we already are. But a start, perhaps, is to appeal
to your own honest efforts to take possession of how you are already conducting your successful knowing, deciding, and doing. The obscurantist
about matters of fact mistakes the real for the unreal; the bungler about
matters of choice and value brings into existence a person who is actualizing the unvaluable. Are you indifferent as between the valuable and the
unvaluable? Do you really believe yourself incapable of ever judging correctly value or its absence? Later, at Dundale Mansion, will you be indifferent as between enjoying Beef Wellington (or sushi) and good
conversation, on the one hand, and, say, being bored into submission by
your most tiresome colleague, on the other? I doubt it. "One's judgments
of value are revealed as the door to one's fulfillment or to one's loss."20
Successful performance grounds, and should control, theory.
Rather than belabor this point, I want now to turn to how inner law
begins to unfold itself into norms that, with the benefit of coercive enforcement, govern individuals and their communities-the proximate
concern of lawyers' work. A starting point is the Scholastics' insight that
what is good, always is particular. The judgment of value must be a judgment of what is concretely good, because what is good merely in the abstract might be devastating in the particular case. But though judgments
of value must be judgments of the particulars, the good (what is valuable
for humans to realize) is not limited to the vital values that are good for
humans one by one. The human good is not only individual; it is also
social. Humans operate to realize individual goods, as when Adam who is
hungry and alone picks a tangerine from a tree and feeds himself without
Eve's notoriously able assistance. Humans also cooperate; they work together to realize both individual and social goods. The manner in which
cooperation is working itself out, Lonergan referred to as the good of order,

it is the concrete structure of human interaction by which certain individual and social goods are realized. 2 1 A system of distribution that gets
bread to those who need it, when they need it, is, to that extent, a good of
order. A legal system that sees that only the culpable are punished is, to
that extent, a good of order.
An elusive aspect of goods of order is that we humans are not related
to them by our feelings. Feeling hungry, we are on the way to knowing
whether, when, what, how it would be good to eat; but we do not hunger,
19. For an insightful summary of Lonergan's ethics, see Frederick Crowe, An
Exploration of Lonergan'sNew Notion of Value, in APPROPRIATING THE LONERGAN IDEA
51 (Michael Vertin ed., 1989).
20. LONERGAN, supra note 18, at 39.
21. See LONERGAN, supra note 10, at 596-97.
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
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except metaphorically, for goods of order. The goodness and value of
cooperative regimes must be apprehended and known without the help
(or hindrance) of feelings; they are pure intelligibilities, reached on the
level of judgment, and were only latent in mere experience. Affirming
that knowing is a matter of correct understanding, in judgment, of the
intelligibility in what is given in experience, we can be at home with what
is lost on the empiricist who mistakes mere experiencing for knowing.
Judging, for instance, that everyone's eating regularly is a good, we are in a
position to determine to (try to) bring into being not just individual
goods, but also the good of order that proliferates and protects such individual goods. A legal system that contributes to realizing valuable ways of
living, as by enforcing (just) contracts for the baking and distribution of
bread, is pro tanto a good of order.
Returning, now, from goods of order to the desire to know that makes
their discovery possible, I want to urge again, before turning to some of
the contours of a rule of law indicated by a jurisprudence of intelligent
subjectivity, that we should regard the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know as inner law. This unconventional usage will rankle especially in the ears of those who crave or already stipulate a univocal
definition of law. Such shock therapy is desirable inasmuch as it drives
home the unexpected point that "prior to the criteria of truth invented by
philosophers," or even lawyers, "there is the dynamic criterion of the further question immanent in intelligence itself." 22 In Lonergan's idiom,
"the pure question" 2 3-the detached, disinterested, unrestricted drive to
know that has as its object all of reality and value-constitutes us as who we
are and can become. Because it is the norm to which all other human
norms must conform, recognizing it as inner law strikes me as eminently
clarifying. We are committed to a world of fact, not by first knowing,
what it is and that it is worth while, but by an inability to avoid
experience, by the subtle conquest in us of the Eros that would
understand, by the inevitable aftermath of that sweet adventure
when a rationality identical with us demands the absolute,...
and, when [it] is attained, imposes upon us a commitment in
24
which we bow to an immanent Anagke.
In other words, we become lawful, if at all, from the inside out, by obedience to the laws of the human spirit working itself out in knowing and
25
choosing.
Do not get me wrong; Lonergan's rhapsodic prose cannot obscure
that we are guilty of much less. However, unvarnished silliness is not a
concrete possibility, at least not for long. I once talked to a group of law22. Id. at 221.
23. See id. at 9 (describing elements of "pure question").
24. Id. at 331.
25. See id. at 618.
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yers about how to interpret statutes. The post-lecture discussion began
with a rankled hearer's blurting out, "I didn't understand a word you
said." This would have been unfortunate, but the would-be intellectual
terrorist at once proceeded to withdraw his own sting by delivering a solil26
oquy demonstrating to all present that he understood perfectly well.
"One may be willing to play the buffoon, but one wants to do it intelligently." 2 7 And this fact, though more modest than a Platonic Form, has
the advantage of being a real rock on which to build a jurisprudence and,
thence, a rule of law fit for (potentially) intelligent human subjects.
II.

TOWARD

A RULE OF LAW OF INTELLIGENT SUBJECTmTY

A.

Getting Methodical

The application of force "in the name of the law" may turn out to be
necessary, but unless we are to be as blunt as the force others' unwillingness to be intelligent calls forth, first we ourselves must be intelligent-for,
as Lonergan muses, "Is everyone to use force against everyone to convince
everyone that force is beside the point?" 28 We cannot make people be

intelligent, but we can, at least in the first instance or the second, appeal
to their intelligence, recognizing that the surd already lodged in the situation may call for or await other solutions. 29 Responsibility-intelligence
in deciding and acting-entails creating structures and systems that can
create and give effect to binding norms that order our living toward discovering and instantiating values. By law, we mean and should meanthough we often say other things instead-norms of conduct, aimed toward values, capable of coercive enforcement in the community. What I
would like to sketch in what follows is something of the rule of law that is
indicated by the jurisprudence which takes its stand on the desire to know.
The foundation of such a legal undertaking is its commitment to method.
Results matter, of course, but method, as I shall describe it, is-with the
exception I reserve to the end-what makes the right results possible and
then actual. There is risk that my emphasis on method will mislead. We
offer first-year law courses in legal method; we offer upper-level courses in
the venerated "legal process" of Hart and Saks; we talk about method in
law the way we talk about the weather, never quite sure how much or little
there is to talk about and how it matters anyway. My particular trouble
with method or process as lawyers usually talk about it is that, while to
some extent it has received its shape and structure from the methodical
character of intelligent subjectivity itself (a fact pursued by Mary Ann
26. See Brennan, Realizing the Rule of Law, supra note 3, at 228.
27. Bernard Lonergan, PhilosophicalPositionswith Regard to Knowing, in 6 CoLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL PAPERS

1958-1964 221, 224 (Robert C. Croken et al. ed., 1996).
28. Lonergan, supra note 10, at 632.
29. On the place of grace and love in transforming possibilities, see infra, Part
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Glendon) 30 , rarely have its proponents understood that (with that exception to which we shall come at the end) only to the extent that it is so
shaped and structured, is it capable of binding subjects at the level of
intelligence.
I called attention, in Part I, to human intelligence as a dynamic compound of several irreducibly different, but functionally united and structured operations. We must experience before we can understand, we
must understand before we can judge, and so forth. If knowledge is to
enter, we must progress from one operation to the next-and inner law
bids us do so. The pattern of operations that lead to correct judgment is
normative, for it reveals that it is, indeed, the way to satisfy the unalienable
desire to know. But though knowledge enters one judgment at a time,
judgments can build on and correct those that have come before. To borrow a line from Lonergan: "The wheel of method not only turns but also
rolls along." 31 The results of methodical inquiry cumulate and progress.
Such "results set a standard, and because the standard is met, the pattern
of related operations is normative: it is the right way to get the job
done." 32 Method turns out to be a normative pattern of related and recurrent operations that generate cumulative and progressive results. 3 3 Bernard Lonergan, from whom I learned to think about method this way,
learned about method from the pattern of structured operations pursued
by empirical scientists, what we refer to as "scientific method." One of
Lonergan's particular contributions was to point out that the structured
pattern of operations performed by the natural scientist is in fact but one
application of the invariant pattern by which any knowledge-subject to
the exception reserved to the end-enters. Most especially, Lonergan observed that not just our knowing, but our deciding how to live, depends
upon our acceding to the normativity of cognitive method. Not just ethics, but the goods of order it calls forth, will be methodical-if, that is, they
are to square with intelligence, the dynamic pattern of structured operations by which knowledge enters.
I have conditioned the emergence of a rule of law on its being the
achievement of persons engaged in methodically seeking valuable ways of
living, and, as I have just suggested, an aspect of being methodical is differentiating and specializing. Subjects intelligently engaged in the life business of setting up structures and orders for human living, including the
good of order we refer to as a legal system, will give primacy to method,
30. See MARY

ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN

is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY, 231 (1994); Mary Ann
Glendon, Knowledge Makes a Noisy Entrance: The Struggle for Self-Appropriation in the
Law, in 10 LONERGAN WORKSHOP 119 (Fred Lawrence ed., 1993).
THE LEGAL PROFESSION

31. LONERGAN, supra note 18, at 5.
32. Bernard J.F. Lonergan, Religious Knowledge, in A THIRD COLLECTION: PAPERS BY BERNARDJ.F. LONERGAN 129, 140 (Frederick E. Crowe ed., 1985) [hereinafter

PAPERS BY LONERGAN].

33. See id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss2/2

12

Brennan: Law and Who We Are Becoming
2005]

LAW AND WHO WE AR-E BECOMING

using it to confirm and to correct and to add to the results of previous
applications of that method. Rooting our undertakings in method is only
a beginning, however. To deliver the specialized knowledge we need,
method will have to be particularized. Successful biologists and chemists,
for example, are united in the use of scientific method and divided by the
ways that they particularize that method. With respect to human living,
the same basic method applies to figuring out how to create and run a
family as to how to create and run the polis, but those who try to run a
polis without more sophisticated particularizations and specifications of
method than we find in a successful household will produce a spectacularly disappointing city. Successful cities are made, in part, by the
methodical contributions and cooperation of engineers, economists and
architects. Families can thrive without them, though, of course, no family
can truly thrive if the larger landscape of which it is a part is run clumsily.
A legal system shaped by a jurisprudence of subjectivity would respect the
need for, and conditions for obtaining, specialized knowledge-without
disrespecting the fact that in law we are after truly valuable, not merely
efficient, human living. I would observe in passing that Lonergan is one of
the too few exceptions to Catholic thinkers' slighting economic analysis;
Lonergan insists upon careful and systematic attention to the conditions
of the possibility of increase in human living. 34 Common sense must not
be allowed to prevent specialization; specialists must not lose sight of their
service to valuable human living.
B.

Jurisdiction, Text, and Authority

A second aspect of a jurisprudence of a rule of law of intelligent subjectivity (the first was the primacy of method and the correlative need to
specialize in service of pursuing the good) follows at once from the first.
Questions of jurisdiction, questions of who can (or must) do what in the
name of the law, will be decided on the basis of competence, the capability
of getting the job done under the circumstances that obtain. Of course,
jurisdiction as it has been and is being worked out in our federal system
does indeed reflect judgments of competence; the courts frequently talk
this way (as when they give effect to a congressional delegation to an
agency), and so sometimes does the Congress (as when it determines to
attempt such a delegation). But most of the time, missing in what we hear
and what we can infer about what is really going on, is recognition that
claims of jurisdiction contribute to a system that can bind at the level of
intelligence only to the extent that they contribute to the methodical seeking and implementing of valuable ways of living. We are too used to the
idea that the sufficient purpose and justification for parceling out power
34. See, e.g., 15 BERNARI J.F. LONERGAN, COLLECTED WORKS OF BEINARD
LONERGAN: MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS: AN ESSAY IN CIRCULATION ANALYSIS (Frederick G. Lawrence et al., ed., 1999); 21 BERNARmJ.F. LONERGAN, COLLECTED WORKS
OF BERNARD LONERGAN: FOR A NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY (Philip J. McShane ed.,
1998).
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is, through "checks and balances," to prevent its balkanization, to keep the
lonely Liberal rights-bearer free from government intrusion. 35 Jurisdiction's legitimacy derives exactly from its contributing to a methodical and
adequately specialized system of seeking and implementing valuable ways
of living, with the question of what checks-and-balances are needful being
a subordinate issue. 36 What we must be about when we devise and deploy
species of jurisdiction is the creation of conditions that render it more
probable that those possessed of the power of such jurisdiction can speak
and act with the authority that is the antecedent of the obedience of
intelligence.
There is more to say about authority, but first I need to turn to a third
aspect of the rule of law indicated by a jurisprudence of human subjectivity, concerning "interpretation" and the texts that get "interpreted" in the
name of the law. If I have taken rather long to say something about texts
and interpretation, the reason for my reserve is simple: We cannot intelligently approach the question of who should do what with which texts in
the name of the law unless we first know who these actors are and what
they are up to and whence they receive their warrant. What we have seen
is that humans are subjects who learn progressively and cumulatively, and
that their learning, both about what is and about what is valuable, is propelled and governed by inner law. Now, everyone knows that texts are
neither self-justifying nor self-interpreting, not even in law; they depend
on subjects to perform these acts. What we must add is that subjects, if
they are to perform these acts responsibly, must be doing so as a part of a
methodical pursuit and instantiation of valuable ways of living.
There is a familiar trend in American jurisprudence and legal practice to insist that only texts (rather than, say, legislative intent) contain
evidence of what the law is and, coordinately, to constrict the list of (kinds
of) texts that can be consulted, a reaction against an earlier generation's
finding first statutory, 37 and then constitutional, 38 law in the "penumbra"
of what had been written down. This reactionary trend is a case in point
in David Tracy's claim that "when literate cultures are in crisis, the crisis is
most evident in what they do with their exemplary written texts." 3 9 So it is,

as Mary Ann Glendon observes, that "our legal culture also explains why
35. See, e.g., BRLAN
35 (1994).

Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAw: HISTORY, POLITICS,

THEORY

36. A growing body of legal scholarship seeks to re-shape law's institutions
and the jurisdiction that creates them in light of new learning about what, as an
empirical matter, institutions do well. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian
Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REv. 885 (2003). A defect of
much of this new scholarship is its exclusively economics-driven notion of value.
37. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957)
(finding sources of federal common law "in the penumbra of express statutory
mandates").
38. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (perceiving legal
"penumbras, formed by emanations").
39. TRACY, supra note 11, at 11.
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many American friends of democratic and rule-of-law values have been
driven to espouse what most civil lawyers would regard as excessively rigid
forms of textualism." 4 From there, though, we can go on to observe that
the self-styled "textualists" on the Supreme Court are in the majority in
42
41
such cases as Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida and Alden v. Maine,
where, in answering questions about the states' suability, they proceed not
on the basis of the text of the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or any other isolable constitutional text, but instead (as Justice Kennedy says in his majority opinion in Alden), "[i] n light of history, practice,
precedent, and the structure of the Constitution. ' 43 Justice Souter's dissent in Alden begins by noting that the majority had to confront the fact
that, for its purpose of disallowing Congress from abrogating the states'
immunity in their own courts, "the Eleventh Amendment"-the constitutional text previously invoked as the textual anchor of state sovereign immunity-was simply "beside the point."44 If text is what matters, at least in
Marbury v. Madison,45 Chief Justice Marshall, after his lugubrious essay on
the nature of written constitutions in general, found that "the peculiar expressions of the constitution of the United States furnish additional arguments in favor of' where the case was already headed. 46 But both Marshall
in Marbury and the majorities in Seminole and Alden are right that text, even
the text of the Constitution, is one among an unspecified range of sources
that can properly be consulted by those charged with saying what the law is
47
and then acting in the name of the law.
Situating the process and method of interpreting text within the
larger arena of legal practice shaped by inner law is the critical, legitimating move. Sure enough, one can approach the phenomenon of law as a
sociologist (after the manner of H.L.A. Hart), say, in which case one is not
doing law but instead something else, where the aim is to edify, not to
decide and act. But when one is doing law, one is deciding how others or
one's very self shall live and who we shall become. Joseph Vining catches
this with his customary elegance and insight:
40. Mary Ann Glendon, Comment to Antonin Scalia, in A MATTER OF INTERPRE95, 113 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
41. 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
42. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
43. Id. at 754.
44. See id. at 760-62 (Souter, J., dissenting).

TATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw

45. 5 U.S. 137, 175-80 (1803).
46. Id. at 178.
47. I here take no position on the result in either Seminole or Alden. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75-76 (1996) (holding Congress lacks
power under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from private suits commenced or prosecuted in Article III courts); Alden, 527
U.S. at 712 (holding "[P]owers delegated to Congress under Article I of the
United States Constitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting
States to private suits for damages in state courts.").
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There is always, in law, a decision maker, and what are called
rules in law are expressions of considerations to be taken into
account by a decision maker. They focus not on themselves as a
self-contained system but upon decision-making activity pointing
forward. Talk of rights and rules of a static kind, projecting an
image of law standing off by itself, obscures the focus that legal
rules have in fact, always a decision that must be made, at the
edge of lives that have not been lived before, in a world that has
48
not been seen before.
The act of interpretation that precedes such decision-making, along with
the structures supporting it, must proceed according to method. And so,
for example, instead of imagining that the responsiblejudge's job could be
a simple-minded, almost algorithmic act of giving effect to text, we will
insist that in law the interpreting of texts be pursued as part of a larger
effort, called for by inner law, to gather data about valuable ways of living,
understand and judge them, and give effect to them in an orderly and
ongoing way. This is called for not by a decision of "policy," but by who we
are, for this is how doctrines worthy of our intelligence develop here, in
the absence of angelic abilities. Relatedly, the structure of our intelligence
in action will indicate that "interpretation" be approached in view of the
necessary personal characteristics, particularly the role of creativity in
reaching "the limited absolute," or at least the judgment of probable
meaning. 49 Legal knowledge, in short, is neither more nor less than the
particular fruit of subjects who have mastered their intelligence. The
need of this mastery will be very disappointing to those anticipating easy
absolutes and certainties, and lots of them, in law. Enlightenment hopes
of pure reason are dashed on the discovery that the methodical asking and
answering of questions is not epiphenomenal to, but is constitutive of us
and of our worthy human living. 50
C.

Positivity and Reception

What does this dynamic, open-ended rule of law mean for legal posi-

tivism, the view (roughly) that law (or its sources) is limited to what has
been posited by the authoritative body (or bodies)? While we sometimes
hear that positivism amounts only to an English invention of the nine48.

JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN

218 (1986).

49. For a compendious treatment of what intelligence requires in the way of
hermeneutics in general, much of which is relevant to a specifically legal hermeneutics, see Quentin Quesnell, Mutual Misunderstanding: The Dialectic of Contemporary Hermeneutics, in LONERGAN'S HERMENEUTICS: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND
APPLICATION 19 (Sean E. McEvenue & Ben F. Meyer eds., 1989).
50. If you hear in this dialogical, discursive, or "conversational" model of law
and politics echoes of John Courtney Murray's "conversatio civilis," recall that Murray borrowed much of his epistemology from his fellow-Jesuit Bernard Lonergan.
See generallyJ. LEON HOOPER S.J., THE ETHICS OF DISCOURSE: THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY (1986).
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teenth century, and is rightly opposed by anyone at all sympathetic to natural law, the historical claim is false and the opposition in need of
precision. Positivity, as a concept structuring reflection on law, seems to
have been first articulated in about 1130 by the theological humanists of
Paris and Chartres, 5 1 and in the next century was developed by St. Thomas
Aquinas, on whose side it is almost always better to stand. St. Thomas advances a positivist thesis for those reflecting on law. St. Thomas also advances a positivist thesis as a norm for those doing law, but one that is
instructively circumscribed. I can only scratch the surface, but what is revealed is enough for the present purpose.
Borrowing a distinction advanced by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, St. Thomas asks whether we should prefer to be governed by animate
justice or by inanimate justice. Animate justice here refers to the justice
brought about by the virtuous person, whose virtue, rather than any inanimate law or lex scripta, produces a correct judgment ofjustice. St. Thomas
answers that ideally we should prefer rule by animate justice, but prudentially we must prefer that all things be governed by inanimate justiceordinarily, written law. Instructively, Aquinas's analysis does not proceed
from any fundamental commitment about human law's being only what is
written down, nor, for that matter, does he proceed from essentialist
claims about the necessary role of judge or legislator or other officeholder. The controlling question, for St. Thomas, is how to secure justice-how, in other words, to make the natural law effective, or, in the
terms that I have been using, how to use government to increase the
probability that persons are finding and instantiating valuable ways of living.52 Further, according to St. Thomas, ex natura, from nature, no one
holds the office of making and enforcing law for the community. 5 3 It falls
to the community, as a requirement of inner law working itself out, to
create or recognize offices, repositories of jurisdiction. What gives those
offices and their products and agents authority is their being both54directed
to and successful at realizing valuable living for the community.
If this is so, the Thomistic definition of law, which I paraphrase as 'an
ordinance of reason, for the common good, promulgated by the one who
55
has charge of the community,' must be emended or at least amended.
Under the traditional definition, the lawgiver's promulgated ordinance
can be "law" without regard to whether that ordinance has in fact been
received by the community. Contemporary American thinking focuses on
51. See John Finnis, The Truth in Legal Positivism, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAw:
ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 195 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
52. See RUSSELL HITINGER, THE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL
LAw IN A POsT-CHRISTIAN WoRL 72-75, 101-02 (2003).
53. See id. at 76-77 (noting St. Thomas "does not believe that anyone has the
authority of judgment from the natural law itself").
54. The idiom is somewhat different, but see id. at 97-112.
9
55. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE Ia-IIae q. 0, art. 1-4 (San
Paolo ed., 1962) (1273).
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our law-producing courts, especially the Supreme Court, as the oracular
generators of welcome or dreaded law, with precious little attention to the
(legal) significance of the non-reception of such decisions. In some instances, those decisions may in fact fail the test of being "of reason." But
the point that interests me here is that if we approach the question of law
from the point of view of human subjects in the process of becoming lawful, we cannot ignore whether the promulgation of the court (or the legislator) is in fact moving them to act-actively contributing to who they are
becoming. A promulgated norm that has little or no role in actually making the community lawful is "law" in only a diminished sense.
This is because law, by doing what is in its nature to do, points to
values and (thus) guides conduct. Father Ladislas Orsy makes this point,
and adds a critical clarification, in his observation that "reception by the
community belongs to the fullness of the law." 56 The reception of the law
by individuals has not only the effect of shaping individuals but, in doing
so, of creating a community of persons united in the active pursuit, discovery, and realization of certain kinds of values. The compound nature of
human cognition has consequences for community. Community of one
sort results from people's sharing experience; community of another sort
results from people's sharing understandings of their common experience; yet another kind of community results when people of shared unof
derstandings also share the same judgments; and still another sort
57
If
community results from people's valuing and acting in common ways.
a legislature passes a statute allowing tax credits to those who give money
to private (including religious) schools, then we become individuals and a
community of people actively supporting private (including religious)
schools inasmuch as we receive and act on that statute. The extent to
which this is a worthwhile turn, for individuals or the particular community, is contingent on many variables; what is not contingent is that when
(putative) law is received and acted upon, it changes who we are, individually and communally.
D.

Culture

But if, as I have suggested, reception by the community belongs to the
fullness of law, and law has a benign and necessary office in our living
responsibly-still, pan-jurism is to be avoided. Law is "the one principal
cultural component we [Americans] all have in common," but law is only
one part of culture. 58 By culture, I mean not just "high culture" (most
things Florentine and all things by Evelyn Waugh), but rather the set of
56. LAmsLAs ORsY, THEOLOGY AND CANON
TION AND INTERPRETATION 85 (1992) (emphasis

LAw:

NEW HORIZONS FOR LEGISLA-

added).

57. See Thomas C. Kohler, The Integrity of UnrestrictedDesire: Community, Values,
and the Problem of Personhood, in AUTONOMY AND ORDER: A COMMUNITARIAN ANTHOL,
oG 61-65 (Edward Lehman ed., 2000).
58. Francis George, Law and Culture in the United States, 48 AM. J. JuRis. 131,
135 (2000).
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reasons and values we have for action. Marriage and family are obvious
and embattled examples. Sometimes it is said (as by John Finnis) that
upon these law "supervenes," giving what were already held to be valuable
ways of living the imprimatur and form of law.5 9 This seems true, but I
would shift the emphasis. Sometimes, out of the very pursuit of valuable
ways of living, law is generated on the basis of an authoritative judgment
that a coercive and binding norm is necessary or desirable for the community or some of its members to realize such ways of living. Because legal
norms point to, and order, our lives toward valuable ways of living, to the
extent that our culture mistakes values or pursues a studied agnosticism
regarding what is valuable, our (putatively) legal norms will lack what it
takes to bind our intelligence. 60 When culture carries mistakes about, or
communicates indifference to, valuable ways of living, law's source and
predicate are lacking.
What our American culture (as I read it) denies more and more is
that cultures themselves, including that part of culture that is law, "may be
judged valuable [exactly] insofar as they set the conditions under which
authentic knowers and choosers . . .value themselves precisely as knowers

and choosers." 6 1 When above I urged that "the pure question" is inner
law, the idea was that in all our living we reach out, as best we can, to the
real and the valuable. To be sure, we must expect disagreement and must,
therefore, make respectful room for persons and ideas with which we disagree. What we cannot do, without violating inner law, is meet some questions arbitrarily. "Negatively, . . . the unrestricted desire excludes the

unintelligent and uncritical rejection of any question, and positively the
unrestricted desire demands the intelligent and critical handling of every
question." 62 This is a tall order. Thus, we cannot tolerate or survive in a
culture that undermines the conditions of the possibility of our being
(communal) seekers, knowers, and realizers of value.
The undermining contribution of the notorious "Mystery Passage" in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey63 is to say that the "heart" of liberty as protected by our constitutional law is the "right to define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life." 6 4 In place of the obligation to search freely for and instantiate the
valuable, is proffered the unfettered right to self-assertion. Lost, in the
theory at least, is recognition that seekers of meaning and value cannot
long survive a culture that denies the integrity of their strivings. As human
subjects absorb the cultural vision of Casey, they lose the capacity to embrace meaning and value, including law's, as true. As Cardinal Francis
George observes, in the world of pure subjective autonomy and assertion:
59. See id. at 139.
60. See id. passim.
61. FLANAGAN, supra note 16, at 200 (emphasis added).
62. INSIGHT supra note 10, at 638.
63. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
64. Id. at 851.
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[W]here freedom is not a property of persons but precedes
them, the law can only be experienced as an unintelligible restraint. In place of free cooperation of persons according to the
law, we can see-in the degraded world of Casey-nothing higher
than mere compliance with law, and the scene ranges down to
sullen conformity, a series of listless performances, subjugation to
another's will.

65

In such a cultural climate, people:
[Hlave to pay a double price for their personal attainment of
authenticity. Not only have they to undo their own lapses from
righteousness but more grievously they have to discover what is
wrong in the [cultural] tradition they have inherited and they
66
have to struggle against the massive undertow it sets.

Few are capable of so much, and so it is that a society in decline digs its
collective grave with arresting efficiency. Reversal may await the coming of
prophet or saint.
E.

Correcting the CriminalLaw

Let me move toward my conclusion by spelling out where, in myjudgment, "valu[ing] ourselves precisely as knowers and choosers" leads on a
concrete question concerning Anglo-American criminal law. 67 In that
memorable language of The Common Law, of which I quoted a phrase at
the beginning, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., opines that:
[I]f, for instance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his
congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven,
but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they
sprang from guilty neglect. His neighbors accordingly require
him, at his proper peril, to come up to their standard, and the
courts which they establish decline to take his personal equation
68
into account.
As a descriptive matter, little has changed since Holmes wrote; at least for
the most part, our courts do decline to take the defendant's personal equation into account. And, at least when criminal condemnation and punishment are at issue, it seems to me that this cannot be justified, unless for a
reason to which I shall come in a moment.
65. George, supra note 58, at 146.
66. PAPERS BY LONERGAN, supra note 32, at 121.
67. See Patrick McKinley Brennan, On What Sin (and Grace) Can Teach Crime, 5
PUNISHMENT &

Soc'v 347 (2003) (pursuing "Catholic criminal law" analysis; issue

guest-edited byJeffrie G. Murphy and Patrick McKinley Brennan).

68.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw
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On the view I have sketched here, what is asked of us is that we let
questions occur, seek as best we can to answer them, and then-making
proper provision for tolerable disagreement-live by the results. While
reserving ample room for the occasional splash of supererogation (in the
performance of prophet, saint, or unassuming neighbor), we might say
that what is asked of us is that we be diligent seekers of the good. In English, "diligence" is a dry word, but less so if we recall that its Latin root is
"diligere," which means to love or to care about (as in Augustine's and
others' imperative, "dilige etfac quod vis," which means, love and do what
you will). As I intend it here, diligence is the requirement, set by inner
law, that one be-as much as possible-attentive, intelligent, reasonable,
and responsible. In contrast to a regime of cosmic strict liability, the standard of diligence looks to the concrete particulars of the person; it takes
full account of the fact that there are forces that limit or block a person's
capacity to let questions occur. Some are genetic, others psychological,
and still others are cultural.
Certain medieval theologians captured the diligence standard in the
doctrine that if a person do "quantum in se est," what is in him, God will
grace him. 69 If what God asks of each of us in the courts of heaven is that
we do "what is in us," and not a cent more, how could Holmes and his
neighbors demand more, especially under pain of criminal condemnation
and punishment? If there is good and sufficient reason for not, as they
say, "subjectivizing" the standard of criminal negligence, it would be that
our courts happen not to be competent to do as much.
But if we have prudential reasons for hesitating or refusing to invest
criminal courts with the power and responsibility to subjectivize the negligence standard, persons coming at the issue of criminal negligence from
the perspective of political liberalism offer reasons of principle for altogether opposing the criminalization of any (mere) negligence. The political liberal's leading reason for limiting criminality to cases of intentional
wrongdoing is that it is ultra vires of a state to concern itself with actually
encouraging pursuit of the good, judging the quality of a person's pursuit
of the valuable, and so forth. 70 The political liberal is pleased, on principle, if the state will confine itself to punishing people who have intentionally caused harm to others. The politician of intelligent subjectivity is not
allowed this principled dispensation. Law's office and justification are to
help us and the neighbors lead valuable lives. To be sure, no one doubts
that prudence must control how much the criminal law is used. But the
prudential judgment of law's place in a particular community, at a particular time stands toto caelo apart from an in-principle veto on law's helping us
M. BRENNAN, By NATURE EQUAL: THE ANATOMY
168, 171-72, 180-81 (1999).
70. See Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Criminal Negligence, 1 BuTT. CRiM. L. REi.
431, 458 (1998); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1423,
1424-25 (1995).
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seek and find valuable ways of living. 7 1 Ajurisprudence of intelligent subjectivity will look to law and legal process to satisfy inner law's demands,
that is, as a tool for encouraging pursuit and instantiation of truly valuable
ways of living.
III.

THE PLACE OF CONVERSION IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW

This is only the beginning of a sketch of the rule of law indicated by a
jurisprudence of intelligent subjectivity-but no worries. I value Beef Wellington, so I am going to end with two pointers in the direction this is
headed. After seeing the thing in the round (if only skeletally), you can
begin to judge for yourself what in it might be worth pursuing.
First, I have emphasized the exigence and possibility of our developing
as individuals, as community, and as polity. Lonergan was puzzled at people's reluctance to believe that social progress is possible. The Catholic
Church, however, developed doctrine and practice; no longer sanctioning
slavery and occluding liberty of conscience, the Church condemns slavery
and promotes liberty of conscience. 72 Thus, there is hope for us allincluding our legal undertakings. But hope, if it be naive, will cancel itself. I have emphasized the error of political liberalism's ignoring or denying our responsibility as a community to seek the good; the correlative
error is to forget that people who can be good also can be very wicked.
Robert Cover was right: "Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain
and death." 73 Rather than reduplicate the pain and death they are meant
to avoid, our political and legal undertakings must reckon intelligently with
the certainty that, sure enough, we will do evil. Sometimes evil is glamorous; other times it is merely stupid. As to the latter, a workable political
and legal system must anticipate people's bucking the increase in government that is necessary if certain valuable ways of living are to be realized.
But if authority is needed to resist evil, it also is needed to settle which
among the mutually inconsistent valuable ways of living we shall pursue.
There will be need of that true and secure tolerance that is based not on
indifference or strategy, but on prior recognition of human value.
Second, we must reckon with other dimensions in which reality is not
simply what meets the eye. Here we return to the problem, thematized at
the outset and then reserved several times to the end, of nature's relationship to grace, and to my assertion that grace controls all that comes
before, to wit, nature. Denis the Carthusian, a fifteenth-century theologian, speaks for the Catholic tradition: "There is a twofold grace or human
71. See generally ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL (1993) (arguing that,
as matter of principle, criminal law should be used prudently to assist people's
moral development).
72. SeeJohn T. Noonan, Jr., Development in Moral Doctrine, in 54 THEOLOGICAL
STUDIES 663, 664-76 (1993) (describing and defending development of Catholic
moral doctrine).
73. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601, 1601 (1986)
(footnote omitted).
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perfection, then, namely, a natural one of which the philosophers speak
and a supernatural one which Scripture teaches."7 4 Catholics have sometimes thought that what Denis refers to as the supernatural but "human"
perfection is available only to a subset of humanity. Brittle applications of
the maxim "extra ecclesiam nulla salus" (outside the Church there is no sal-

vation), have not been lacking, and they have had sad social consequences. But today, in addition to condemning slavery and promoting
religious liberty, the Catholic Church is witnessing both the supernatural
calling of all humanity and, correlatively, the rights of all humanity to conditions in which human flourishing is possible. While I would not wish to
obscure the obvious fact that some people are not members of the Catholic Church, 75 I would be quick to emphasize the universality of God's saving will as the Catholic Church preaches and teaches it.
A Catholic jurisprudence affirms that all are called not just to salvation, but also to build a world populated by cities in which mutual respect
is ordinary. This is not the memo issued by "Law and Economics," nor is it
the brief filed by C.L.S.; but it is what Catholics believe. The act of believing that we human subjects are called to and capable of more than meets
the eye does not itself generate a world in which respect is our daily bread,
but it is a start. We must anticipate that history will be, if not a decline, a
dialectic of progress and regress; living under inner law requires constant
vigilance, ready resilience from lapses. Progress is not the province of
mere dreamers; even economists are necessary if we are to develop more
worthy ways of living. If the future's general direction is to be progress, in
large measure this would be because of the concentrated efforts of those
who are "painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be
made." 76 The necessary conversion, as I would call it, ordinarily will take a
bottom up form. The conversion is the subject's becoming more attentive, more intelligent, more reasonable, more responsible. It is a matter of
subjects' figuring out and then pursuing what they are capable of. Getting
to know ourselves is the beginning. In an older idiom, we might call this
living by-and, with the virtue of prudence, making effective-the natural
law, recalling that in the tradition of which that idiom is a part, the natural
law is our "first grace." 77 But in addition to these conversions that come
from subjects' deciding, one cognitive or volitional operation at a time, to
follow inner law, there are the conversions that come from love's taking
over, as "when God floods our hearts with the Holy Spirit He has given
74. Louis
NATURE

AND

DUPRE, PASSAGE TO MODERNITY. AN ESSAY IN THE HERMENEUTICS OF
CULTURE 277 n.22 (1993) (quoting and discussing Denis the

Carthusian).
75. See CATECHISMUS CATHOLICAE ECCLESIAE Sec. 832-35 (1997).
76. BERNARD LONERGAN, CognitionalStructure, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS

OF BER-

245 (Frederick E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran eds., Univ. of Toronto Press 1988) (1967).
77. HITTINGER, supra note 52, at xix.
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us." 78 In this moment, "a new principle takes over, '79 and we do what we
did not know ourselves capable of. Method is turned upside down.
The jurisprudence of intelligent subjectivity that I have sketched offers important ecumenical possibilities. It takes a foundational stand on
what everyone can at least begin to know about himself or herself, including where, according to inner law, we humans should universally be
headed. And while it also allows room for God's fresh surprises, it affirms
what surprising and powerful things God has already done for all His
human children in creating in them a desire to know all that is, which
necessarily must include God Himself. Fulfillment of that desire must
wait, but in the interim, inner law draws us out of ourselves to affirm more
and more of the real and the good, and to live accordingly. No angels or
angelic abilities are at hand to govern us. We can rely only on ourselves,
including all that God gives us. Who will we become? One can always
choose to play the buffoon-as can an entire culture, for a season. 80 Better, I think, to become persons who love, or, failing that, who at least do
81

quod in nobis est.

78. Romans 5:5.
79. Lonergan, Natural Right and HistoricalMindedness, in PAPERS

BY LONERGAN,

supra note 32, at 175.
80. See Brennan, supra note 67, at 349 (paraphrasing, in part, Paul Kahn).
81. Cf LONERGAN, supra note 62, at 717.
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